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ABSTRACT 
We recently published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine 
describing a crisis in cognitive testing, as doctors and medical researchers 
increasingly face copyright claims in sets of questions used for testing mental 
state. We encouraged the creation of a cultural norm in medicine, in which 
medical researchers would ensure continued availability of their tests through 
open source licensing for any copyrights that might exist. 
In this piece, we consider the legal side of the question. Although copyrights 
are being copiously asserted in medical testing, are those rights valid, and should 
they be upheld? The legal precedents in this area are anything but clear, and the 
courts are divided in the few analogous circumstances that have arisen. 
We examine analogies in standardized testing, computer compilations and 
baseball pitching forms to consider the marvelous question of how to 
conceptualize a process—which is the purview of patent law—when that process 
consists of words—which are the purview of copyright law. We also look from an 
economics perspective at the issue of investment and value creation in the 
development of de facto standards. 
Legal scholars are so often in the position of looking backwards, teasing out 
solutions to problems that have developed within a doctrinal or theoretical area. 
Rarely does one have the opportunity to affect the course of events before 
problems become so deeply entrenched that they are intractable. This is such a 
moment, and the legal and medical fields should take advantage of the 
opportunities presented. 
 
* Robin Feldman, Professor of Law and Director, The Institute for Innovation Law, 
University of California Hastings College of the Law. 
* John Newman, MD, PhD, Research Fellow, Division of Geriatrics, University of 
California San Francisco. We wish to thank William Casey, Thomas Field, Peter Gigante, C. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December of 2011, we published an article in the New England Journal 
of Medicine describing the current crisis in cognitive testing.1  Doctors and 
medical researchers are scrambling to adapt to the recent assertion of 
copyrights in a popular screening method that has been used for decades to 
measure cognitive impairment. Although the assertion of this particular set of 
rights is relatively new, doctors are increasingly facing copyright claims in a 
variety of tests, including those for depression and for pain.2 
In the New England Journal article, we tried to encourage the creation of a 
cultural norm in the field of medicine, in which medical researchers would 
ensure continued availability of their tests through appropriate open access 
licensing for any copyrights that might exist.3 In this companion piece, we 
consider the legal side of the question. Although copyrights in medical testing 
are being asserted frequently, are those rights valid, and should they be upheld 
in whatever courts eventually hear the issue? The legal precedents in this area 
are anything but clear, and the courts are divided in the few analogous 
circumstances that have arisen. In the article below, we examine analogies in 
standardized testing, computer compilations and baseball pitching forms to 
build a theoretical framework for the marvelous question of how to 
conceptualize a process—which is the purview of patent law—when that 
process consists of words—which are the purview of copyright law. In 
addition, we look from an economics perspective at the issue of investment and 
value creation in the development of de facto standards, and the implications 
 
 1.  John Newman & Robin Feldman, Copyright and Open Access at the Bedside, 365 
NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2449 (Dec. 29, 2011). Although the New England Journal of Medicine 
accepts only two author names, C. Bree Johnston was an essential author of that article, as 
well as this one. 
 2.  Appendix “A” contains a chart of mental state tools for which some form of 
copyright has been asserted. 
 3.  With open source licensing as a general matter, others are free to copy and use the 
work, as long as any improvements created are made as freely available as the original work. 
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for enforcement of copyright. 
As fascinating as the theoretical challenges may be, the question of 
copyright in medical testing has immediate, practical ramifications. Given the 
uncertain legal terrain, doctors and researchers are quietly acquiescing to the 
demands of those asserting copyright in medical tests, for fear of becoming 
entwined in lengthy and expensive legal proceedings that could result in a 
costly judgment. Such fear could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it 
prompts the creation of an industry norm for licensing medical tests. Courts 
and legislators have been known to defer to industry custom, even when they 
harbor some doubts about the wisdom of the underlying logic.4 
Legal scholars are so often in the position of looking backwards, teasing 
out solutions to problems that have developed within a doctrinal or theoretical 
area. Rarely does one have the opportunity to affect the course of events before 
problems become so deeply entrenched that they are intractable. This is such a 
moment, and the legal and medical fields should take advantage of the 
opportunities presented. 
I. THE CRISIS IN COGNITIVE TESTING 
The current scramble in the field of cognitive testing relates to the Mini-
Mental State Examination (“MMSE”), which is a brief, 30-point questionnaire 
used to assess cognitive function. It is widely used to screen for cognitive 
impairment in elderly patients, follow the progress and severity of dementia, 
assess the cognitive impact of an injury, stroke, psychiatric illness, and to 
provide a “standard” measure of cognition in research studies. The MMSE test 
includes simple questions and problems concerning orientation in time and 
 
 4.  For examples of courts deferring to industry custom despite underlying concerns, 
see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) 
(“[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of 
the inventing community.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring) (“The settled expectations of the biotechnology 
industry—not to mention the thousands of issued patents—cannot be taken lightly and 
deserve deference.”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“[A] determination of whether the limitation [of a patent claim] is sufficiently 
definite is highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the 
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area).”) (internal citations 
omitted). For literature discussing the logic of acceding to industry custom, see Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008) (arguing 
that courts’ reliance on industry custom chills innovation); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L. J. 882 (2007) (arguing that risk 
aversion causes over-licensing, which in turn creates “doctrinal feedback” and a subsequent 
expansion of intellectual property rights); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of 
Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (arguing that reliance on 
custom and “best practices” in intellectual property law leads to expansion of owners’ rights 
at expense of users). Cf. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty in 
legal standards leads to over-compliance by economic actors who modify their behavior 
beyond what is socially optimal.) 
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place, remembering a list of words, attention (spelling a word backwards), 
language use and comprehension (writing a sentence, following a command), 
and basic motor skills.5  The MMSE was first published in 1975 in a scholarly 
article written by Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, and Paul R. McHugh.6  
While the MMSE was included in the journal as an appendix, the authors 
retained their putative copyright interests in the test. 
As we have noted, the Mini-Mental State Exam was widely and freely 
distributed for decades. With its brevity and simplicity, the Mini-Mental State 
Exam became the most widely used, and widely studied, bedside cognitive test 
in the United States.7 For twenty-five years the test was copied and distributed 
innumerable times in every media available, finding its way into every geriatric 
syllabus and pocket guide, as well as across information websites and the 
internal websites of individual institutions. Its use for the evaluation of 
cognitive impairment became the standard of care. The exam was memorized 
by countless exhausted residents and medical students, who could probably 
recite the test better than their own names, and was administered to myriad 
patients over the years. The widespread use of the particular test added to its 
value and reinforced its use. Researchers working in different settings and 
different time periods could compare and evaluate results more easily. Doctors 
moving from patient to patient or hospital to hospital had an easy point of 
reference for comparing the status of patients. To our knowledge, the authors 
made no attempts to assert copyright against these uses across the decades. 
All this began to change in 2000, when the authors transferred copyright of 
the MMSE to MiniMental LLC, a Massachusetts corporation founded by the 
authors. MiniMental registered the transfer with the U.S. Copyright Office.8  In 
March 2001, MiniMental entered into an agreement with Psychological 
Assessment Resources (“PAR”) granting PAR the exclusive rights to publish 
and license all intellectual property rights to the MMSE in all media and 
languages across the world.9 In February 2010, PAR released a second edition 
of the MMSE. In addition to selling an official licensed version of the MMSE 
for $1.23 a test, PAR began to enforce its exclusive right to distribute the 
MMSE.10 As a result of PAR’s enforcement of its exclusive license, the 
 
 5.  Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, & Paul R. McHugh, “Mini-Mental State”: A 
Practical Method for Grading the Cognitive State of Patients for the Clinician, 12 J. 
PSYCHOL. RES. 189-198 (1975). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See, e.g., Shulman, et. al, IPA Survey of Brief Cognitive Screening Instruments, 18 
INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS  281, 288 (2006) (survey reporting that the Mini-Mental State 
Exam “is the test that is most widely recognized and is considered a well-known standard 
benchmark. Everyone can relate to a score on the MMSE because of its widespread use and 
familiarity. It has become the lingua franca of cognitive screening.”) 
 8.  U.S. Copyright Office Registration No. TX0005228282 (June 8, 2000). 
 9.  U.S. Copyright Office Registration No. TX0007369373 (Nov. 23, 2010). 
 10.  For example, PAR asked UpToDate to remove the MMSE from its website. See 
MMSE Copyright Frequently Asked Questions, 1-3 (2006), http://www.pbm.va.gov/ 
Clinical%20Guidance/FAQ%20SHEETS/MMSE%20Copyright%20FAQ.pdf (last visited 
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MMSE has disappeared from the latest editions of medical textbooks, pocket 
guides and clinical toolkits.11 
The latest chapter in the saga of the Mini-Mental State Exam involved the 
take down of an alternative cognitive assessment tool, the Sweet 16. The Sweet 
16 was designed to be faster to administer than the MMSE, with less 
educational bias and similar test characteristics to the MMSE. The authors 
noted in their article that “a number of cognitive assessment instruments, 
including the MMSE, are copyrighted and now have restrictions or fees 
associated with their use,” and that in response, “the Sweet 16 is open access, 
whereas the MMSE and the MMSE-2 are restricted by copyright.”12 
The publication of the Sweet 16 in March 2011 was greeted with fanfare in 
the medical field and even in popular media.13 As the authors promised in the 
article, the instrument was made freely available for download on their website 
with very permissive licensing terms for clinical and academic use. Apparently, 
however, the owners of the MMSE were less enthusiastic about the new 
competition. Shortly after publication, the test was removed from the authors’ 
website (hospitalelderlifeprogram.com), with the notice that, “In response to 
requests from Psychological Assessment Resources (PAR), Inc., we are 
removing the Sweet 16 from our website.”14 Although neither PAR nor the 
Sweet 16 authors have commented in public, PAR’s request probably relates to 
perceived similarities between the Sweet 16 and its own MMSE variants.15 
The saga of the Mini-Mental State Exam has cast a shadow that extends 
over many tools in daily clinical use, from cognitive screening and clinical tests 
to prognostic indices. Although the Mini-Mental State Exam is the most public 
and widespread example of copyright enforcement to date, PAR is not alone in 
asserting copyrights in particular medical tests, and PAR itself offers more than 
30 varieties of copyrighted testing from a chronic pain test to a trauma 
symptom checklist. As a result, primary care physicians, neurologists and 
psychiatrists are struggling to understand the notion of copyright in their daily 
treatment of patients, fretting about the possibility that they may have been 
infringing copyrights for some time, and puzzling over how they could 
 
Mar. 20, 2012). See also About PAR, http://www4.parinc.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 
20, 2012). 
 11.  Ruth Martin & Desmond O’Neil, Taxing Your Memory, 373 THE LANCET 1997, 
2009-10 (2009). 
 12.  Fong et al., Development and Validation of a Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool: 
The Sweet 16, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., 432, 436 (2011) (internal citation omitted). 
 13.  Elizabeth Cooney, Quick Quiz Screens for Cognitive Impairment, WHITE COAT 
NOTES - BOSTON.COM (Nov. 8, 2010, 4:14PM), http://www.boston.com/news/health/blog/ 
2010/11/sweet_16_tests.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
 14.  See Update About the Sweet 16 Instrument, HOSPITAL FOR ELDER LIFE PROGRAM 
(HELP), http://www.hospitalelderlifeprogram.org/private/sweet16-disclaimer.php?pageid= 
01.09.00 (last updated Jan. 13, 2012). 
 15.  Jim Amos, Persisting Popularity of the Sweet 16 Saga, THE PRACTICAL 
PSYCHOSOMATICIST: JAMES AMOS, M.D (May 31, 2011), http://jajsamos.wordpress.com/ 
2011/05/31/persisting-popularity-of-the-sweet-16-saga/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
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suddenly find themselves in the company of MP3 downloaders and movie 
bootleggers. 
II. RELEVANT CONCEPTS IN COPYRIGHT 
In general, society provides protection for intellectual property in the 
interests of encouraging innovation and creativity. Although one could find 
animating logic for an intellectual property regime from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, the US system has always been unabashedly utilitarian. That is, 
we grant rights to creators and innovators in the hopes that it will encourage 
creation and innovation, which we believe will redound to the benefit of 
society as a whole. Thus, it is not that we reward inventors because we believe 
they are inherently deserving of reward, we reward inventors because we 
believe this will benefit society as a whole. Although we have made occasional 
forays into moral rights, generally in the context of satisfying our treaty 
obligations, the US intellectual property system has remained steadfastly 
focused on creating the optimal incentives that will promote innovation and 
creativity.16 
Copyright applies to any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.17 Under modern copyright law, although not the law in 
force at the creation of the Mini-Mental State Exam, an author is not required 
to take any affirmative steps for copyright to accrue. Prior American copyright 
law required that an author go through certain formalities to obtain copyrights, 
such as inserting proper notations on a work of authorship and submitting a 
copy of the work to the Library of Congress. Under modern law, however, 
copyright attaches from the moment of fixation in a tangible medium. Thus, 
everything written down—from the noblest novel to the humblest email—may 
have copyrights attached, assuming that the writing is an original work and that 
it displays a modicum of creativity.18 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that, “The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’”); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (SDNY 1992), 
aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (CA2 1994) (noting that “the incentive to profit from the exploitation of 
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of 
knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”). The 
Supreme Court seems to have subtly retreated from that position in 2003 in  Eldred v. 
Ashcroft. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (arguing against Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion by stating that, “Justice Breyer’s assertion that ‘copyright 
statutes must serve public, not private, ends’ similarly misses the mark. The two ends are not 
mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an 
incentive to pursue private ones.”) (citations omitted).  
 17.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a). See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“copyright assures authors the right to their original expression”). 
 18.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. See, e.g., New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. 
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that commodity 
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Copyright also protects a compilation work, which is defined as “a work 
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that 
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a 
whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”19  A compilation copyright 
protects the order and manner of the presentation of the compilation’s 
elements, but it does not necessarily extend to the elements themselves.20 Some 
works, such as those that are factually based or are compilations of facts, 
receive a lower level of copyright protection than purely fictional works. This 
is known as “thin” copyright protection. 
Although a work may be copyrighted, this does not mean that everything 
within the work is protected from copying. Copyright does not protect the idea 
of a work, but only the specific expression that is used.21 As the Supreme Court 
recently noted, this “idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance 
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.” Due to 
this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes 
instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.22 
In the classic example discussed by countless law students across time, if 
Shakespeare were to write Romeo and Juliet today, he would be able to protect 
aspects such as the plot lines and the dialogue, but he would not be able to 
protect the idea of a story about two star-crossed lovers from feuding families 
who die tragically.23 In other words, copyright protects the way in which an 
 
futures exchange did not have copyright in settlement prices it produced); Southco, Inc. v. 
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that parts numbers were not 
copyrightable, as they are both not original and analogous to short phrases or titles); 
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
publisher’s factual enhancements to judicial opinions were not sufficiently creative or 
original to warrant copyright). For this article, I will focus on copyright as it applied to 
written works, although copyright applies to a wide range of creative works, including 
sculptures, photographs, maps, and computer software. 
 19.  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 20.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 21.  Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“The general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, 
free as the air to common use.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 54, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not preclude others from using ideas or 
information revealed by the author’s work.”) 
 22.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 23.  See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[A][1][b] (updated 2011) (hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright) (explaining the 
idea/expression dichotomy by offering West Side Story as an example of a work that 
theoretically infringes on Romeo and Juliet. “Certainly, the dialogue and setting, and even 
much of the characterization, story line and action, are far removed from the Shakespeare 
play. Yet, applying the pattern test, it will be seen that not merely the basic idea, but the 
essential sequence of events, as well as the interplay of the characters, are straight out of 
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author chooses to express an idea or a set of facts, but not the idea or facts 
themselves. Thus, writing a textbook that teaches and explains chemistry does 
not give the author rights in the formulas explained, although it may give the 
author rights in the particular way in which the formulas are explained.24 
In a similar vein, copyright protection does not extend to things such as 
systems, procedures, and methods of operation. Not only are these analogous to 
underlying ideas and formulas, they are also the purview of patent law.25 
Granting copyrights to these would create a backdoor method for allowing 
those unable to meet the more rigorous requirements of patent law to block 
access to these nonetheless. An author’s description of the procedure may be 
copyrighted, but not the procedure itself.26 
In unusual circumstances, there may be only one or a limited number of 
ways to express an idea. In that case, even the expression is not copyrightable 
on the grounds that granting copyright to the expression would grant an 
impermissible right over an idea itself.27 Thus, when an idea and its expression 
are inseparable, copyright law considers that the two have “merged” into a 
single expression, which is not copyrightable. 28 
Similarly, if certain elements are all but indispensable to works in a 
particular genre—e.g. an amorous embrace in a romantic comedy, the inclusion 
of two teams and a ball in a football video game, references to a deity in sacred 
music, etc.—such elements are not copyrightable. These are referred to as 
scenes a faire, which is described as “incidents, characters or settings which are 
as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard in the treatment of a 
given topic.”29 In those circumstances, courts have reasoned that these 
elements are so close to the non-protectable idea that the expression provides 
nothing new or additional beyond the idea itself.30 
 
‘Romeo and Juliet.’”) 
 24.  William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 4:42 (updated Feb. 2012). 
 25.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (noting that copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of form in which it 
is described, explained, illustrated or embodied”). See, e.g., Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, 
Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 468 (2d Cir. 2002); Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 
50, 54 (2d Cir. 1999); Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 228 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955); Reyher v. 
Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 26.  SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 27.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 28.  See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ 
will not be barred, since protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a 
monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright owner.”). 
 29.  Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See e.g., Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (an 
expression will be found to be merged into the idea when “there are no or few other ways of 
expressing a particular idea.”). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Products, Inc. v. 
McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 30.  See Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Atari, 672 
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Copyright, at its core, protects the right to make copies of something. This 
can include photocopying a book, performing a play, or singing a song. 
Copyright also provides the exclusive right to create derivative works, which 
can include things such as a movie based on a play, a biography based on 
journal entries, a compilation or abridgement, and other forms of new versions 
based on an original.31 
III. WHAT COULD BE THE INFRINGEMENT? 
What exactly could creators of cognitive and related medical testing claim 
as an infringement of their rights? Understanding the question requires parsing 
through the different materials related to each test. The most obvious avenue 
would be to claim that institutions are making unauthorized copies of 
instructions or general information related to the test. These would include 
descriptions of what the test is for, the circumstances that are appropriate for 
using the test, and any other descriptive information. Anyone copying the 
author’s explanation of these things verbatim, or in a way that is sufficiently 
similar, could be liable for copyright infringement.32 This would be a garden-
variety copyright infringement test, although interesting issues might arise over 
the question of whether there are only one or a limited number of ways to give 
certain instructions or information about the test. In an unusual case, for 
example, a circuit court found that copying contest instructions almost word-
for-word did not constitute copyright infringement.33 The contest itself was not 
copyrightable, presumably as a system or method of doing business. On the 
almost verbatim copying of the instructions, the court found that while more 
than one form of expression was possible, “at best only a limited number” of 
forms of expression could exist, with the result that copyright protection could 
not be extended to that expression.34 
The more interesting question relates to copying the test itself. On one 
level, test authors could claim that regardless of whether any expressive 
 
F.2d at 616). See also Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742. 
 31.  See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Derivative Works, 
Copyright Circular 14 (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf. 
 32.  See, e.g., Atari, 672 F.2d at 614 (“[T]he test is whether the accused work is so 
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the 
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material 
of substance and value.”); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 
(2d Cir. 1946) (copying can be found if the similarities between two works are “so striking 
as to preclude the possibility that the plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the 
same result.”). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501. 
 33.  See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily 
requires,’ if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit 
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, 
could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”) (citing Sampson & Murdock 
Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905)). 
 34.  Id. 
632 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:485 
description or instructions about the test were included, a copy of the words of 
the test itself would constitute copyright infringement. Thus, if an institution 
printed reminder cards or posted the test on its internal website, those actions 
would constitute infringement. One might also claim that each written 
application of the test constitutes a separate copy. For researchers who 
administer the test through a written, online survey, for example, PAR does 
indeed charge a license fee for each person who takes the test.35 
It is difficult to imagine how the authors could try to claim that 
administering the test verbally could constitute making a copy of the test. In 
order to constitute infringement, a copy must be fixed in a tangible form, and 
oral admission of the test would lack this element of fixation.36 Although 
verbal performances of certain works may require a license, if the performance 
is public,37 administering a test to an individual patient would not constitute a 
public performance. Most important, the statute specifies that the performance 
right is limited to literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pantomime, 
motion picture, and other audiovisual works.38 Administering a test to a patient 
would not fall within any of these categories.  
On its website, PAR is rather delicate in its language concerning just 
exactly what must be licensed.39 The Permissions and Licensing page explains 
that the procedures are for granting permission to “use any of our publications” 
and that the company will consider requests “for permission to reproduce, 
modify, or translate any copyrighted publication.”40 Thus, the language 
carefully grounds itself in references to the written publications and 
reproduction of those, and could suggest that PAR is asking for no more than 
licensing for traditional copies of written materials. 
Other parts of the page and the permission request form hint that PAR is 
asserting rights to each admission of the test, whether verbal or written. The 
page states that written permission is required prior to “using any part of a test” 
and notes that the per copy royalty fee does not include the cost of purchasing 
the test manual, which is required for permission to use all or part of the test.41 
In addition, the permission request form, which must be submitted before PAR 
will agree to quote a royalty fee, includes questions such as “how many people 
will you be testing” and “how many times will each person be tested.”42 The 
 
 35.  See email from Vicki McFadden, PAR Permission Specialist (May 7, 2013) (on 
file with author). 
 36.  See 17 U.S.C.A. §101 (definitional section of the statute defining copies as 
material objects in which a work is fixed). 
 37.  See 17 U.S.C.A. §106(4). 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  See PAR, Permissions and Licensing, http://www4.parinc.com/Products/ 
PermissionsAndLicensing.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See id. (noting that the fee will be determined after PAR reviews the request 
form). See also PAR, Permission Request Form Online Submission, 
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implication is that, among other things, PAR is requiring a license and charging 
for each verbal admission of the test, and our conversations with physicians 
and hospital administrators indicate that the medical community understands 
PAR’s licensing demands in that manner. Regardless of how far the PAR 
organization is claiming rights, it is important to think through each potential 
claim that could be made within the context of cognitive or similar medical 
testing. 
The challenging thread running through all of this is that medical tests of 
this kind stand at the boundary between patent and copyright, raising the mind-
bending question of how to conceptualize a process, which is the purview of 
patent, when that process consists of nothing more than words, which is 
normally the purview of copyright. The section below traces the tangled 
modern case law in this area back to the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden43 to 
make sense of the question. 
IV. THE TROUBLE WITH BAKER 
There are remarkably few lines of case law in copyright that are analogous 
to cognitive testing, and those that exist reach conflicting conclusions on both 
the outcomes in particular circumstances and the proper analytic framework. 
All of them, however, trace their heritage back to the 1879 Supreme Court case 
of Baker v. Selden.44 The Baker case and its proper interpretation have been the 
subject of considerable controversy, particularly as they relate to the proper 
approach for copyright protection of computer programs.45 
Baker concerned copyright for a book explaining a new book-keeping 
system. The innovation of the bookkeeping system lay in its ability to display a 
particular time period—a day, a week, or a month—on a single page or two 
pages facing each other. The book contained an introductory essay describing 
the system followed by blank forms with the columns and heading arranged to 
illustrate the system. The accused copier used a similar system with the 
columns and headings arranged differently. 
The Court focused on the contrast between a book itself and the system a 
 
https://www4.parinc.com/webuploads/permission_request/Permission_Req_Form_ 
distributed.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2012). 
 43. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 44.  Id . 
 45.  See, e.g., Samuelson, infra note 46, at 1948-53 (arguing that Baker has suffered 
from misinterpretation); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 1149, 1171-76 (1998) (arguing that uncertainty of copyright for computer programs 
raises fundamental questions about copyright subject matter); J.H. Reichman, Computer 
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for 
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 690-95 (1989) (arguing that 
intellectual property law is underprotective of new technologies, particularly software). See 
also Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 23, at § 2.18[C]-[D] and William F. Patry, 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 182, 212, 225 (6th ed. 1994) (discussion on software 
copyright). 
634 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:485 
book is intended to teach or illustrate.46  The book, and the words chosen by 
the author to describe the system it is teaching, can be protected against 
copying. The system itself, however, is free to all, unless the author wishes to 
apply for a patent on the system, which would require a much more extensive 
demonstration of novelty than is necessary under copyright law. As the Court 
noted, 
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the 
construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns; or on the mixture and 
application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines 
to produce the effect of perspective, —would be the subject of copyright; but 
no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the 
exclusive right to the art or manufacture described therein . . . . To give to the 
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no 
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise 
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of 
copyright.47 
The history of the Baker case demonstrates the danger of allowing 
copyright protection under these circumstances. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the widow of the treatise-writer had tried to impose license fees 
throughout Ohio on those who were using the accounting system.48 In this 
manner, the Baker case is reminiscent of the attempts to charge for each use of 
the Mini-Mental State Examination.49 
The Court’s statement is remarkably straightforward, but the application of 
the principle is more complex than it appears—and would become even more 
so across time. For example, one might conceivably argue that the copyright 
holder in Baker was not trying to prevent individual bookkeepers from using 
the new system, but simply wanted to prevent other publishers from copying 
his forms and selling them to people using the system. Historical evidence in 
the case, carefully traced in a recent article by Pamela Samuelson, suggests the 
contrary.50  The copyright holder in the case actually did attempt to apply 
copyright to individual uses of the bookkeeping system, not just copies made 
by competing publishers. 
The Baker case, nevertheless, demonstrated the problem in trying to draw a 
distinction of even this limited kind. If the forms are an essential part of 
practicing the system, preventing copying of the forms prevents anyone from 
using the system itself. Thus, protecting the forms would give copyright 
 
 46.  For a detailed history of the Baker v. Selden case as well as an explication of how 
the case has been misinterpreted, see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes 
Systems and Processes from the Scope of its Protection, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1921 (2007). 
 47.  Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
 48.  For a fascinating and detailed description of the history of Baker v. Selden, see 
Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between 
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, (Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, eds.) (Foundation Press 2005). 
 49.  See text accompanying notes 35-42, supra. 
 50.  See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1931. 
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holders a backdoor method of obtaining patent-like control over the process 
without satisfying any of the requirements for obtaining a patent.51 
The Baker Court identified the heart of the problem, noting that  “where 
the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams 
used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and 
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given 
therewith to the public.”52  
The Court went on to hold that blank account-books are not the subject of 
copyright and that the author’s copyright in the book explaining the accounting 
system did not give him the exclusive right to make and use the forms included 
in the book.53 
 The most direct codification of Baker v. Selden can be found in the 
regulatory prohibition on copyright protection for blank forms. Copyright 
Office regulations now provides that “[b]lank forms, such as time cards, graph 
paper, account books, diaries, blank checks, address books, report forms, order 
forms and the like, which are designed for recording information and do not in 
themselves convey information,” are not subject to copyright.54  
 The Copyright Act also contains a limitation on copyright subject matter 
that echoes the discussion in Baker. Specifically, § 102(b) states that, “In no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, plan, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is . . . embodied in such 
work.”55 The language emerged as part of the debate concerning the extent to 
which computer programs should be given copyright protection.56 
Application of Baker and the corresponding language in the legislation and 
regulations has stirred considerable debate among judges and scholars. What is 
particularly striking in the case law is the extent to which judges have 
expressed discomfort or uncertainty about the decision they felt obligated to 
reach and the underlying logic—regardless of whether the decision involved 
upholding copyright protection or denying copyright protection to a work that 
involved a blank form. Consider the case of Advanz Behavioral Management 
 
 51.  See id. at 1932 (citing Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer 
Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 119, 1130 (1986), for the proposition that “the presence of 
patent law’s rigorous standards cautions courts . . . not to allow copyright, with its notably 
lax standards, to protect functional elements of copyrighted works.”). 
 52.  Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. 
 53.  Id. at 106. 
 54.  37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c). See Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 
1104, 1106 (9th Cir.1990) (describing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 as a “codification” of Baker). But 
see Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D. Conn. 1989); Digital Com. 
Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (printed forms 
and electronic screens that convey de minimis information or contain copyrightable subject 
matter are copyrightable). 
 55.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (promulgated as part of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 56.  See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1944-52 (tracing the development of the 1976 
Copyright Act from the introduction of a copyright revision bill in 1964). 
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Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor.57 The plaintiff in Advanz operated a home health 
care business and claimed copyright in a series of five forms used for recording 
patient information. Those forms were titled Medical Social Service 
Evaluation, [Medical Social Service] Communication Note, Medical Social 
Service Discharge Summary, Medical Social Service Follow-up, and Daily 
Visit Route Sheet. Applying Ninth Circuit precedent, the judge in the Central 
District of California denied copyright protection, while bemoaning his 
obligation to do so. With thinly disguised disapproval, the judge wrote a 
lengthy discussion of case law in the Ninth Circuit, noting conflicting 
approaches in other jurisdictions.58 He concluded with the comment that the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area exemplifies an “unusual and 
unfortunate feature of contemporary copyright law,” and one that ignores the 
policy issues at stake.59 
On the flip side, the Second Circuit, which had declined the opportunity to 
follow the Ninth Circuit precedent, allowed a copyright claim on a form for 
compiling statistics in baseball to survive summary judgment in the Kregos 
case. In allowing the copyright claim to move forward, however, the court 
engaged in its own handwringing. 
In reaching this conclusion, we confess to some unease because of the risk 
that protection of selections of data, or, as in this case, categories of data, have 
the potential for according protection to ideas. Our concern may be illustrated 
by an example of a doctor who publishes a list of symptoms that he believes 
provides a helpful diagnosis of a disease.60 
Of course, the Kregos hypothetical is reminiscent of attempting to copyright 
medical testing of cognitive function, a similarity that will be explored below. 
Although the Kregos court upheld copyright protection, the copyright 
holder had less to cheer about than one might imagine. The court found that the 
level of protection provided was quite limited, following the notion described 
above that copyright protection is thin for works that are merely compilations 
of facts.61 As a result, the court found that the arrangement of the statistics 
lacked even the minimal amount of creativity required for copyright 
protection.62 In addition, although the decision of which statistics to include did 
contain the requisite creativity for copyright protection, the court cast doubt on 
 
 57.  Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Res., Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). 
 58.  See id. at 1186-1192 (noting that the Ninth Circuit had cited with disapproval N. 
Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (N.D. Ill. 1967), and that the Second 
Circuit had distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 
F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir.1991) (stating that “many courts have recognized that there can be 
protectable elements of forms that include considerable blank spaces.”), on remand, 795 F. 
Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d after remand, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 1112 (1994)). 
 59.  See Advanz, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. 
 60.  See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707. 
 61.  See text accompanying notes 19-21. 
 62.  See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 709. 
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whether the accused infringer’s rearrangement of the data could constitute 
infringement. In particular, the court suggested that an overlapping, although 
somewhat different selection of statistics, would not infringe.63 
Finding a coherent and consistent logic does seem to have eluded the 
courts on this issue across time. The cases have reached a variety of results and 
applied different lines of logic for claims related to blank forms. Some have 
looked favorably on claims of copyright. For example, one case upheld 
copyright on a work titled, “Cash Dividend Check Pay to the Order of.”64 
Although the facts as described by the court are not a model of clarity, the work 
appears to have been a book of checks to use in connection with a savings 
stamp plan, with instructions on the checks concerning how to affix the stamps 
as payment. At the time, the relevant regulatory language, which differs only 
slightly from the modern language, read as follows: 
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications 
for registration of such works cannot be entertained: (c) Words designed for 
recording information which do not in themselves convey information, such as 
time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, score cards, 
address books, report forms, order forms and the like.65 
Nevertheless, the court upheld the copyright claim. The court held that in 
addition to including the unfilled-out form of a check, the writing conveys to 
the public information relating to its stamp plan. Thus, the court reasoned, the 
work constituted an integration of the two such that there was sufficient 
originality, and that this level of originality permitted copyright to attach.66 
Another court in Norton v. Augustana Hospital denied a motion to dismiss 
a claim for copyright protection of a series of forms for recording medical 
laboratory tests.67 The court reasoned that although the forms were used to 
record information, the format and arrangement could also serve to convey 
information about the types of tests to be conducted and the information which 
is deemed important.68 
Other cases have been less hospitable to those who would claim copyright 
in forms for recording information. For example, one court rejected copyright 
protection for “superbill” forms that doctors could use to obtain reimbursement 
from insurance companies.69 The forms contained simple instructions to the 
patient for filing insurance claims; boxes for patient information; simple 
clauses assigning insurance benefits to the doctor and authorizing release of 
patient information; and two lengthy checklists for the doctor to indicate the 
 
 63.  See id. at 709-710. 
 64.  See Check Corp. v. Davis, 247 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 65.  See id. at 460. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 133, 1967 WL 7487 
(N.D.Ill.1967). 
 68.  See id. at 135. 
 69.  Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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diagnosis and any services performed, as well as the applicable fee.70 
In declining to adopt the Norton court’s rule, the court argued the 
following: 
Norton’s holding that a medical laboratory test form “conveyed information” 
because it contained some of the possible categories of information but not 
others, thus indicating which information was important, is potentially 
limitless. All forms seek only certain information, and, by their selection, 
convey that the information sought is important. This cannot be what the 
Copyright Office intended by the statement “convey information” in 37 C.F.R. 
202.1(c).71 
The court was referring to the language of the copyright regulations—language 
that lists as among the types of works not subject to copyright, “Blank forms, 
such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, 
scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and the like, which are 
designed for recording information and do not in themselves convey 
information.”72 
Baker and its legislative progeny have been the subject of significant 
scholarly and judicial criticism, with scholars themselves adopting differing 
approaches and viewpoints.73  These debates, along with detailed discussions 
of the inconsistent case decisions, have been admirably chronicled in prior 
scholarly work, as well as in the careful protest penned by the magistrate judge 
in the Advanz case.74 Key arguments include the following: detractors contend, 
among other things, that the prohibition on copyright protection for blank 
forms is based on an unwarranted extension of dicta from Baker v. Selden, that 
it is logically inconsistent and at odds with the rest of copyright law, and that it 
is incompatible with guidelines set forth by the Copyright Office following the 
1976 revision.75 Professor Nimmer summarized these criticisms by way of 
examples: 
The Regulations seem to be unjustified in denying copyrightability to any 
work merely because it is designed for recording information. Thus, books 
intended to record the events of baby’s first year, or a record of a European 
trip, or any one of a number of other subjects, may evince considerable 
originality in suggestions of specific items of information that are to be 
recorded, and in the arrangement of such items.76 
 
 70.  See id. at 1105. 
 71.  Id. at 1107. 
 72.  37 C.F.R. 202.1(c). 
 73.  See e.g., Samuelson, supra note 46; Weinreb, supra note 45; Reichman, supra 
note 45. 
 74.   See, e.g., Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A]–[D]; Pamela Samuelson, Why 
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of its Protection, 85 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1921 (2007); Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Res. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998); see also other authors cited note 73, supra. 
 75.  See Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A]–[D]; William F. Patry, COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE 328 (6th ed. 1994) 
 76.  Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[C][2] at 204.2. Numerous courts have cited to this 
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In contrast, proponents of the rule have offered justification based on at least 
four distinct rationales:77 (1) blank forms contain no expression;78 (2) some 
blank forms may contain expression, but that expression is unoriginal;79 (3) 
some blank forms contain expression, but that expression is indistinguishable 
from the idea it expresses;80 and (4) blank forms, no matter their design, do not 
convey information, but are merely repositories for information.81  Common to 
these rationales is the notion that documents which are “designed for recording 
information and do not in themselves convey information”82 lack even a 
modicum of creativity, and thus fail the originality requirement of § 101 of the 
Copyright Act.83  The Copyright Office has affirmed this interpretation of 37 
C.F.R. § 202.1(c): 
An item that serves merely as a means for recording information and does not 
itself convey information or contain original pictorial expression does not 
constitute copyrightable subject matter . . . . The Copyright Office . . . applies 
a standard consistent with that applied to all works submitted for registration: 
does the work contain an appreciable quantum of original, creative 
expression?84 
V. OUTSIDE THE UMBRELLA OF COPYRIGHT 
In analyzing the issue of whether copyright should apply to medical testing 
such as the MMSE, the most helpful approach flows from Professor 
Samuelson’s scholarly work in the context of copyright protection, and 
limitations on that protection, for computer programs. 
Samuelson recently chronicled a long detour in which courts and 
commentators characterized Baker as nothing more than precedent for the 
idea/expression distinction and the notion that only certain elements of a 
copyrighted work will be protected. In contrast, Samuelson traced the judicial 
and legislative history indicating that Baker and subsequent legislation 
intended to mark off certain areas as entirely outside the protection of 
copyright. Thus, things such as processes, systems and methods should be 
 
passage. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing a 
copyright claim on a form for compiling statistics in baseball to survive summary judgment 
but finding that the protection would be thin); Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (discussed 
below); Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 279 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (upholding copyright in “personal data forms”). 
 77.  See Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
 78.  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 107. 
 79.  See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971–972 
(11th Cir. 1983); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c). 
 80.  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 107. 
 81.  See, e.g., Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 82.  37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c). 
 83.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
 84.  45 Fed. Reg. 63299–63300 (Sept. 24, 1980). 
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entirely beyond copyright protection, regardless of the form in which they are 
embodied. 
The difference is more than academic. Samuelson carefully demonstrated 
how courts following the “Baker describes the difference between ideas and 
expression” approach in computer software cases granted protection too 
broadly, particularly in cases relating to granting protection for the structure, 
sequence, and organization of the program as well as to the look and feel of the 
software.85 In contrast, she argues that a firmer grasp of the notion that the 
Supreme Court and Congress intended to place processes and systems entirely 
outside the realm of copyright protection will lead to a better interpretation of 
the limitations on the categories of things granted protection within the field of 
computer software. 
Samuelson also notes that some courts have tried to skirt the problem by 
using the scenes a faire doctrine or noting a lack of originality to avoid 
granting copyright protection to systems or functions.86 In other words, one 
could argue that instructions embodying a system cannot be copyrighted 
because such a system can only be described in a certain way or because 
describing the system in that way lacked originality to begin with. She points 
out that the problem with relying on this type of approach is that in many cases, 
the instructions chosen are not the only way to accomplish something, and they 
may indeed contain sufficient originality to meet the low threshold required for 
copyright protection.87 
To some extent, the problem in this area lies with a confusion between the 
notion of a system in general and the notion of a system in particular. This 
distinction may be more apparent in the context of medical testing than 
computer programs. If the question is a system in general for testing cognition, 
there will always be many ways to go about it. If the question, however, is one 
particular system for testing cognition, there is only one way to express that 
system because the expression of the system—in this case, the words used to 
carry out the test—is the system. Protecting those words would grant protection 
to the system itself. 
From this perspective, Samuelson’s admonition to remain true to Baker 
and to remember that systems should be excluded from copyright protection 
makes sense. That approach is a cleaner way to ensure that in applying 
copyright protection, we will not inadvertently cast the net of protection too 
widely. 
Applying the logic of the Samuelson approach, the words of medical tests 
should be entirely beyond the subject of copyright. They are a system, a 
method of going about something: a process for determining the level of brain 
 
 85.  See id. at 1974 (noting that courts misled by the narrower interpretation of Baker 
have erroneously granted copyright protection to methods of organizing information, parts 
numbering systems, and coding systems). 
 86.  See id. at 1974-77. 
 87.  Id. at 1976-77. 
Spring 2013] COPYRIGHT AT THE BEDSIDE 641 
functioning. If they represent sufficient novelty and meet the other 
requirements of patentability, the person who designed the test can seek a 
patent on a method of determining cognitive functioning. From the perspective 
of copyright, however, the test itself lies outside the protection of copyright, 
regardless of what form the test is embodied in.88 Written words, spoken 
words, and—when inventors take us to this point—telepathically  transmitted 
words, none of these would fall within the subject of copyright protection. As 
always, however, words used to explain, teach, provide the background and 
history of, or otherwise amplify the test may be copyrightable, as long as one is 
not attempting to copyright the words of the system itself. 
VI. INSIDE THE UMBRELLA OF COPYRIGHT 
For those unpersuaded by the notion that blank forms should fall outside 
the umbrella of copyright, an analysis of the requirements for triggering 
protection when a work falls within the copyright system should still lead to a 
denial of protection for cognitive medical testing. Cognitive medical testing 
falls on the unprotected side of the lines that have been drawn in analogous 
cases that treat blank forms as falling within the umbrella of copyright and 
copyrightable under some circumstances. 
A. Selection & Compilation 
For example, courts in some circumstances have given copyright 
protection to forms when the questions to which one fills in the answer 
represent a selection among possible existing facts. The Second Circuit in 
Kregos granted copyright protection to a pitching form distributed to 
newspapers that contained nine categories of information about opposing 
pitchers scheduled to start that day’s baseball game.89 The same circuit granted 
copyright protection to a selection of 500 out of 18,000 baseball cards 
considered to be “premium”90 but denied copyright protection to a compilation 
of five items of information about various municipal bond calls—items of 
information that had appeared in “tombstone ads.”91 In reconciling the three 
cases, the Second Circuit explained that with compilations of facts, the 
originality component, that is, the creative part, involved deciding which facts 
 
 88.   See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Should Copyright Protect Evaluative Tools? IP 
FRONTLINE (Jan. 11, 2012) (op/ed arguing that “[a]s seen from the perspective of Baker, the 
MMSE is the art; it describes nothing; its object is use, not explanation”) available at 
https://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=26212&deptid=4 
 89.  See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991), on remand, 795 
F.Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d after remand, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1112 (1994). 
 90.  See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 91.  See Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). 
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are important. When the universe of possible facts is sufficiently great, the 
creator may be able to demonstrate the originality necessary for copyright 
protection, particularly when the selection is different from prior groupings.92 
The cases regarding compilation and selection of facts generally involve 
choosing among a universe of facts that are already known and easily 
ascertainable. This is quite different from cognitive medical testing. The 
difference appears to be what was bothering the Kregos court when it 
expressed unease about its decision. As described above, in finding copyright 
protection for the newspaper pitching form, the Kregos court expressed 
concern that, “protection of selections of data, or, as in this case, categories of 
data, have the potential for according protection to ideas. Our concern may be 
illustrated by an example of a doctor who publishes a list of symptoms that he 
believes provides a helpful diagnosis of a disease.”93 This hypothetical, of 
course, comes eerily close to the notion of trying to copyright medical testing. 
The creative and original element in cognitive medical testing is really 
about finding a process for diagnosis, that is, a process for figuring out whether 
a patient has a particular disease or mental state. It is not about choosing from 
facts that are easily accessed, it is about finding a way to get to facts that are 
not. One can think of the activity in the following manner: The fact that exists 
is “whether the mind is working properly” or “how the mind is working in 
comparison to other minds.” The creator’s contribution is figuring out a process 
to get to that fact. 
Thus, although one is certainly choosing among a large universe of 
questions, that choice is in pursuit of the best process for determining facts 
about that person’s health. In the copyright terminology that the Kregos court 
was using, that fact is no more than an idea, and thus would not deserve 
copyright protection. In the language of whether something belongs in patent or 
copyright, the creative element is a process. Protection of a process does not 
belong in copyright but is the purview of patents. Thus, if any protection were 
available, it would be found in patent law, where we asks tougher questions, 
including how much of an advance is your process over prior processes that 
existed and were you, in fact, the first to invent it. 
Finally, even in finding copyright protection, the Kregos court granted a 
remarkably limited level of protection. The court determined that an 
overlapping set of items would not infringe the copyright, if the items differed 
in anything more than “a trivial degree.”94 Thus, even if a court were to find 
copyright protection, which we believe would be improper here, variations of 
 
 92.  Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704-705; see also Wabash Publ’g. Co. v. Flanagan, No. 89-C-
1923, 1989 WL 32939 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1989); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. New Eng. 
Newspaper Publ’g Co., 46 F.Supp. 198, 201-02 (D. Mass. 1942); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 682, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer 
Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F.Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 93.  See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707. 
 94.  See id. at 710. 
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the test should not constitute infringement unless the differences are truly 
trivial. 
B. Secured Testing & Licensing 
Of particular interest to those who would like to claim copyright in medical 
testing would be a line of cases upholding copyright protection for secure cases 
involving licensing and admissions exams. These have included exams for 
medical licensing, law licensing and college admissions, as well as the foreign 
service exam.95 For example, in Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman96 and Educ. 
Testing Servs. v. Simon,97 the company that makes the SAT and other 
standardized tests sued test preparation companies for distributing copies of 
prior tests and using prep questions adapted from prior tests.98  Both opinions 
found that the test questions themselves fell within the domain of copyright, 
and the Simon court also held that verbatim copying of questions contained in a 
test was not necessary for a finding of copyright infringement.99 
Secured testing circumstances are a special case, however, and the logic 
frequently revolves around the existence of and necessity for security. 
Discussion frequently focuses on the level of security involved and on the 
importance of preserving the integrity of the exam. Secured testing is of such 
importance that it receives special mention in the legislative history of the 
Copyright Act. In the 1991 amendments to the Copyright Act relating to Fair 
Use, the Senate Report accompanying the Act explained that the amendments 
were “not intended to reduce the protection of secure tests, the utility of which 
is especially vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure.”100 Statements in the 
debate on the amendments underscored the same notion, with one Senator 
specifically mentioning the ACT, SAT, LSAT and MCAT.101 
 
 95.  Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Mikaelian, 571 F.Supp. 144, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1983) 
(copyright upheld for medical school admission test), aff’d, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984); Nat’l 
Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ill. 
1980) (copyright upheld for bar examination), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 692 F.2d 478 (7th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Katzman, 793 F.2d at 539; ETS v. Miller, 1991 
WL 212181 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1991) (upholding copyright and finding that “[a] copyright in 
a compilation of questions, such as the Foreign Service Exam, includes copyright protection 
for the questions themselves.”). 
 96.  Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 97.  Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 98.  See Katzman, 793 F.2d at 536. 
 99.  See Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
 100.  See S.Rep. No. 141, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991). 
 101.  See 137 Cong. Rec. S13923 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (statement of Senator 
Grassley noting that Congress was not intending to “weaken the very strong protection that 
the courts have given to an important type of copyrighted work—secure tests such as the 
ACT, SAT, LSAT, and MCAT”); see also testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights 
(“Secure tests are particularly vulnerable to having their utility obliterated by unauthorized 
disclosure. The courts have, accordingly, been particularly solicitous in protecting these 
works. Indeed, so far as we are aware, the courts have never upheld a fair use claim 
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One could argue that protecting the sanctity of professional licensing and 
admissions exams is best left to regimes other than copyright. For example, 
Section 123 of the California Business and Professions Code prohibits “any 
conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert an licensing examination.” 
Protection of such tests through copyright has a long history, however, and 
remains the current law. 
The licensing and admissions cases frequently involve circumstances in 
which extensive precautions are taken to ensure that the tests are carefully 
guarded. The PAR site suggests that the usefulness and validity of the tests 
would be compromised if the tests became available to the public.102 PAR 
notes that the company secures its materials during development—by requiring 
employees, external consultants, and pilot testing administrators to sign a 
confidentiality agreement—and after development—by making sure that the 
materials are sold only to qualified individuals obligated by professional ethical 
standards to protect the integrity by maintaining confidentiality.103 
The website gives this explanation in a section asserting that the tests are 
protected by copyright and trade secret, and that purchasers may not reveal the 
test questions or any other materials. Purchasers are also forbidden from 
releasing a patient’s data or the results of a patient’s test to individuals who are 
not qualified to review and interpret them, including the patient.104 In other 
words, purchasers are not even permitted to tell the patient what the results 
were. The PAR website notes further that the Department of Health & Human 
Services has provided guidance in a letter stating that it is not a violation of 
HIPAA to refrain from providing an individual’s health information if doing so 
would disclose trade secrets.105 
The security protection that PAR describes sounds much more like garden-
variety trade secret protection, rather than the heightened security measures 
taken with licensing exams. To give one minor example, licensing exams 
generally change their question for each test whereas the MMSE has remained 
the same for an extended period. The issues at stake in maintaining the integrity 
of the MMSE also are not commensurate with the issues at stake in maintaining 
 
advanced by any private entity with regard to copying of secure tests or test questions.”) 
 102. PAR Frequently Asked Questions,  http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx (last visited 
May 4, 2013). 
 103.  See PAR Position Regarding the Release and/or Photocopying of Test Materials, 
http://www4.parinc.com/WebUploads/StaticPages/PhotocopyingTestMaterials.pdf (last 
visited May 4, 2013). 
 104.  See PAR Frequently Asked Questions, http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx (last 
visited May 4, 2013). 
 105.  See HIPPA Statement, http://www4.parinc.com/webuploads/staticpages/ 
HIPAA_Statement.pdf (last visited May 4, 2013) (citing the following as language from a 
US Department of Health and Human Services letter: 
“Any requirement for disclosure of protected health information pursuant to the Privacy Rule 
is subject to section 1172(e) of HIPAA ‘protection of trade secrets.’ As such, we confirm that 
it would not be a violation of the Privacy Rule for a covered entity to refrain from providing 
access to an individual’s protected health information, to the extent that doing so would 
result in a disclosure of trade secrets.”). 
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the integrity of the questions on a professional licensing exam. If a patient has 
heard the test questions before and can “cheat” by already knowing the 
answers, the patient’s care may be less effective—that is, if there are no other 
indications of compromised mental state to which the skilled practitioner would 
respond. This would be a concern, but not of the same type of concern as if 
unquailed individuals were able to memorize questions to a medical licensing 
exam and thereby be released on an unsuspecting public to provide inadequate 
or even harmful medical treatment. In addition, the possibility that a patient 
might cheat on the test by remembering the answers would not be of concern in 
a clinical setting, at least not for cognitive mental testing. If a patient can 
remember answers in that manner, it is likely that their cognitive function is 
normal. 
The notion that the secrecy required for MMSE and for professional 
licensing exams might in any way be equivalent would be somewhat silly in 
any event. The test has been used and distributed widely across time, with 
much of its value coming from the fact that it has remained unchanged for so 
long. Individual patients may even hear the test over and over again across 
time. 
In addition, suggesting that the information in the MMSE test constitutes a 
trade secret is somewhat odd.106 To satisfy the secrecy requirement in trade 
secret, one must ordinarily show that the protected information gives the owner 
an advantage over competitors.107 The appropriate question is whether the test 
itself is well known by competitors, which in this case would mean competitors 
in the field of medicine. Given how widely the test is known, it would be 
difficult to establish that it constitutes a trade secret, at least not in the way that 
secrecy is ordinarily measured for the purposes of trade secret protection. 
Limiting release of the test results is even more puzzling. One could 
imagine PAR might argue that it is concerned about maintaining the quality 
and reputation of its product by ensuring accurate interpretation. The 
genuineness of any such concern might be called into doubt, however, by the 
happy coincidences that could result from denying the release of data. If results 
cannot be released without PARs permission to anyone who is not medically 
trained, then medical researchers, in theory, cannot publish their results in 
medical journals. Such journals are normally available to anyone willing to pay 
a subscription or one-time access fee, regardless of whether that person has any 
medical training at all, let alone training related to cognitive testing. It is 
possible that in the future, PAR could require medical researchers to pay a 
license fee or, better yet, to publish their result only through publications 
operated by PAR. This approach could provide a lucrative revenue stream, 
 
 106.  This issue has been explored by one of the authors in Robin Feldman,  Intellectual 
Property Wrongs, STANFORD J. L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127558. 
 107.  Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). See also Am. 
Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan. 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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despite raising concerns about impeding the flow of medical research 
VII. ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
From an economic perspective, one might be concerned about a potential 
mismatch between the reward that is being claimed by the MMSE copyright 
holders and their contribution to the value of the MMSE. One could argue that 
much of the value of the MMSE has been added by society, rather than by the 
creators of the test. The reason the test is so valuable today relates in large part 
to the extent of use throughout the medical field. Doctors in one hospital can 
use the test to evaluate a patient’s progress or deterioration across time because 
other doctors and hospitals that have treated the patient will have used the same 
test. There is great value in comparing apples to apples. The same phenomenon 
is true for medical research. When researchers are working with data across 
time and in different settings, it is of enormous benefit if the data is collected 
using the same basic test. This allows researchers to more easily aggregate 
large numbers of studies and greater amounts of data. The advantages of 
everyone using the same test can persuade users to stay with a particular test, 
even if it is not the best test available. In fact, medical professionals have noted 
that the test has drawbacks and weaknesses, but its ubiquitous influence makes 
it the best option.108 As one article author noted, the MMSE stands out more 
for its widespread use than for any special properties or for its clinical 
uniqueness.109 
Economists have described this type of phenomenon in terms of network 
effects. With network effects, the fact that everyone is using a particular 
approach can lead others to implement the same approach, even if better 
options are available or become available.110 Network effects have been 
discussed at length in the context of monopoly theory, particularly as a way of 
understanding barriers for new entrants into a particular market and the 
advantages of being the first mover in an area—advantages that are unrelated to 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Kenneth Shulman, et. al, IPA Survey of Brief Cognitive Screening 
Instruments, 18 INTN’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS  281 (2006) (survey reporting that while the 
MMSE has become the lingua franca of cognitive screening, it has limitations related to 
sensitivity, as well as cognitive biases with respect to education, culture, and language); 
David Knopman, The Initial Recognition and Diagnosis of Dementia, 104 AM. J. MED. 2S 
(1998) (noting that the MMSE is the most widely used quantitative mental status 
examination in North America, but noting that its major drawback is lack of sensitivity for 
detecting mild dementia). 
 109.  J. Wesson Ashford, Screening for Memory Disorders, Dementia and Alzheimer’s 
Disease, 4 AGING HEALTH 399, 402 (2008). 
 110.  Although the economic and legal literature on network effects is voluminous, for a 
classic discussion of network effects, see Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and 
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
940 (1986); see also Robin Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079 
(1999) (describing how network effects can allow a monopolist to use leverage to strangle 
next-generation substitutes in their infancy). 
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quality of the product. 
The importance of network effects has been analyzed in the context of 
antitrust analysis, but it also has implications for Intellectual Property. From an 
antitrust perspective, the questions may relate to the circumstances in which 
different market power configurations can create incentives for companies to 
engage in improper attempts to attain and maintain a monopoly. From an 
intellectual property perspective, I suggest that the society should also consider 
the extent to which the value of the intellectual property has been created by 
the contributions of others and not by the contributions of the one claiming an 
intellectual property interest. If intellectual property doctrines are designed in a 
way that credits the full value to those claiming intellectual property, the law 
has created a mismatch between the value contributed to society and the reward 
that is offered as an incentive to create that value. 
One could argue that if our goal is to offer incentives for creativity, 
offering the possibility that one might receive a reward wildly beyond the value 
of what one has actually created is certainly an incentive. That would be a 
lottery-like system, in which the reward is based on luck and essentially 
unrelated to contribution. In theory, one could argue further that creating 
incentives for those who are able to harness or fool society into creating value 
for them might be appropriate, although it seems far from the underlying 
concepts of Intellectual Property. 
Our current Intellectual Property system is far from perfect, and one could 
argue that there is an element of luck involved in whether one can garner a 
return from one’s creation. Nevertheless, conceptualizations of Intellectual 
Property in general, and copyright in specific, do envision trying to create the 
potential for a reward that flows from the contribution of the creator. Moreover, 
our forays at the intersection of Intellectual Property and Antitrust suggest that 
we are uninterested in allowing Intellectual Property rights holders to benefit 
from using society’s contributions through networking effects. 
In this section, we are talking about whether, and under what 
circumstances, copyright doctrines should take into account the fact that a 
particular work has become the de facto standard. In the context of Internet 
standards, Pamela Samuelson has argued explicitly that given the exclusion of 
systems from copyright protection, as well as the concepts of merger and 
scenes a faire, standards should fall outside of copyright protection.111 Items 
may be original enough in the first instance to be protectable but may lose that 
protection as they become standards across time.112 There are also analogies 
available in other areas of Intellectual Property law. For example, in trademark, 
the holder of a trademark can lose rights in the mark through so-called 
“genericide,” that is, if the trademark becomes the general term in the minds of 
 
 111.  Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 
(2007). 
 112.  See id. at 215-220 (discussing among others the case of Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
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the public for that type of product, rather than referring to one particular 
company making the product.113 
Companies will go to great lengths to persuade the public not to use their 
trademark as a generic term. Consider Xerox’s advertising campaign to tell 
people that “You can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if 
you copy a copy on a Xerox copier.” Xerox spent a lot of money on an 
advertising campaign to tell people that you can “copy on a copier” but not 
“Xerox.”114 
The term genericide seems like a strange anomaly. If matricide is killing 
one’s mother, and patricide is killing one’s father, then genericide should be 
killing of the generic, rather than the killing of one’s trademark. Be that as it 
may, genericide as a legal concept is deeply entrenched in Trademark law. 
Some scholars have argued that the logic for genericide flows in part from the 
notion that the Trademark holder should not profit from the labor of others 
when the value of the work is attributable to the collective labor of the users, 
rather than the work of the creator.115 
The issue of trading off the labor of others has arisen in copyright itself. In 
Lotus v. Borland, the court denied copyright protection to a user interface that 
had become the de facto standard in the industry in part because of the 
collective labor of its users.116 As noted in a concurring opinion, “it is hard to 
see why customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it 
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning made by 
the users, not by Lotus.” The MMSE case presents an even stronger case for 
concerns about network effects. Users who wish to switch would not just be 
 
 113.  See Samuelson, supra, note 111; see also Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV.  1054, 1101-
1102 (analogizing copyright case law on industry standards to trademark law’s doctrine of 
genericide); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.2.1, at 2:41 (citing the 
Menell argument and discussing the point). 
 114.  ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 894 (2012). 
 115.  See id. at 898, Note on Genericide, Language, and Policing Costs; see also, Steven 
Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999). 
 116.  See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by 
equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, 
in 1610 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 197 (Edward Elgar 2000) (noting that, “if 
switching costs are high enough, giving copyright protection to a popular user interface that 
has become an industry standard can extend the copyright owner’s monopoly into the 
computer, not just the interface market); see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra  note 
114 at 898, Note on Genericide, Language, and Policing Costs; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis 
of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV.  1054, 
1066-1069. But see William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities in 760  
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 970 (Edward Elgar 2000) (arguing that limiting 
copyright protection for network externalities in the case of computer software could bleed 
over into other areas of copyright, such as fan fiction, and that weakening copyright 
protection allows greater competition by clones but reduces the payoff for innovators); 
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of 
Software, 24 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 321-377 (1995) (criticizing Lotus v. Borland). 
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giving up their own time that has been invested in learning their test, but also 
giving up the ability to speak the same language and therefore interact with 
medical professionals across time regarding this patient and across research 
data with other patients. 
The analogy to trademarks that have become generic is useful from other 
perspectives, beyond the notion of the shared labor of others. Additional logic 
for loss of trademark status when the trademark becomes a generic term stems 
from concern that others would be unable to compete on equal terms. If 
competitors cannot use the words that have become standard in an industry, 
how can they effectively compete? Translated into the context of medical 
treatment, when copyright exists in the words that have become the standard of 
medical care, how can any physician provide quality medical care without 
those words? 
It is important to note that becoming a de facto standard can affect rights in 
the trademark circumstances above, even when the work has become the 
industry standard through no fault of the creator. In fact, courts have found 
genericide when the trademark holder actively policed the mark and worked to 
dissuade adoption by the public.117 In other words, circumstances can arise in 
which, through no fault of the creator, society so fully and heartily embraces 
one’s work that the work is essentially wrenched from the bosom of the creator 
and absorbed into the bosom of society itself. 
Of course, a defense would be even more compelling if the Intellectual 
Property rights holder actively induced adoption of their creation as the 
industry standard while hiding their intention to claim rights for the proposed 
standard. The extreme case arises in patent law, in which formal standard 
setting bodies may require that those who are participating disclose whether 
they have potential patent rights related to the technology being considered as a 
standard. The law has not looked kindly on patent holders who engage in 
deceptive practices such as advocating for a particular technological standard 
without revealing their patent position to other members.118 
The MMSE facts are nowhere near as extreme as those involving 
misrepresentations to formal standards bodies in patent law. Nevertheless, the 
specific circumstances involved in the MMSE are distinct from those in which 
no fault can be attributed to the creator, and other legal issues within copyright 
are likely to come into play. In particular, courts have held that copyright 
holders may not recover for infringement if they have aided or induced the 
infringement, including by silence or inaction.119 This is known as equitable 
 
 117.  See, e.g., Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d. 75 (2d Cir. 
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 91936 (finding genericide despite extensive efforts to 
police the mark). 
 118.  See In re Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Aug. 2, 2006), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf. 
 119.  Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See Nimmer 
on Copyright § 13.07; see also Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-16 (D. Nev. 
2006) (noting that principles of estoppel apply to copyright infringement actions). 
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estoppel, a doctrine that prevents copyright holders from enforcing their rights. 
The general doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that an accused infringer 
demonstrate that the person asserting copyright engaged in certain overt 
acts.120 However, even if a copyright holder did not engage in such overt acts, 
estoppel may arise through silence or inaction, particularly if the silence is 
prolonged.121 In addition, a copyright owner’s acquiescence in infringement 
may, if accompanied by overt acts and continued over a sufficient period of 
time, result in abandonment of copyright.122  In this situation, abandonment 
constitutes a defense to infringement even after the former copyright owner’s 
acquiescence has ceased: 
If the facts show that there was nothing to indicate to [the accused infringers] 
that they were unauthorized to use the copyrighted work, and if they 
reasonably relied on that state of affairs to their detriment, then the result is to 
defeat plaintiff’s cause of action entirely, for the future as well as for past 
conduct.123 
In addition to equitable estoppel, those asserting copyright in the MMSE 
may find that their action is barred through laches, a doctrine that prevents 
plaintiff’s from bringing an action if they have waited an unreasonable length 
of time before coming to court.124 As the renowned Judge Learned Hand noted, 
“it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended 
infringement, to stand inactive . . . and to intervene only when his speculation 
has proved a success.”125 Laches is commonly described as preventing rights 
holders from sleeping on their rights. 
The modern courts are split on the question of whether laches is a viable 
defense to copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit has recently upheld 
laches as a defense to infringement,126 while the Fourth Circuit has expressly 
 
 120.  The accused infringer must show that: (a) plaintiff knew of the accused infringer’s 
allegedly infringing conduct; (b) plaintiff intended that the accused infringer rely upon his 
conduct or acted so that defendant had a right to believe it was so intended; (c) the accused 
infringer was ignorant of the true facts; and (d) the accused infringer detrimentally relied on 
plaintiff’s conduct. See Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Nimmer § 13.07); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 121.  See id. (estoppel may be raised by silence or inaction); DeCarlo v. Archie Comic 
Publ’ns, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 497, 509 n.65, 511 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 11 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (finding estoppel by virtue of “silence throughout decades of ACP’s use of the 
characters”). 
 122.  See Kraft v. Cohen, 32 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 117 
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941); Nimmer on Copyright § 13.06. 
 123.  Keane Dealer Servs, Inc. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 124.  See Haas v. Leo Feist, 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (citing Second Circuit 
laches opinion and finding delay despite notice a viable defense to a claim of copyright 
infringement). 
 125.  Id. See also Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 
1947); Blackburn v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936). 
 126.  See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff failed to 
complain of defendant’s exploitation of James Bond character up to 36 years). See Nimmer 
on Copyright § 12.06[1]. 
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rejected it.127 The Supreme Court has not considered the issue. 
The MMSE would be a good case for application of equitable estoppel—
that is, through silence or even through direct encouragement, allowing users to 
develop an expectation and to rely on the expectation that the tests would be 
freely available—and laches—that is, waiting too long to exercise one’s rights. 
The MMSE was first published in 1975, and copyright was not asserted until 
the copyright was transferred twenty-five years later.128 In the interim, the 
MMSE was widely distributed in textbooks, pocket guides, and web sites, 
becoming the de facto standard for cognitive screening.129 In fact, twenty-five 
years after publication of the MMSE one of the authors of the test wrote that, 
“[o]ne possible reason for [its] popularity is that it is free.”130  
It is likely that the authors, as proud parents often do, put forward their best 
efforts to circulate their work and convince society to embrace their test as the 
standard approach. Even without such efforts, silence in the face of widespread 
adoption of the test across decades allowed health care professionals to form 
the reasonable expectation that the test would be freely available. When the 
creator of a work has allowed a belief to develop that others may freely use the 
work, the creator cannot later decide that widespread adaptation of the work is 
a fortuitous way to make money. Application of these doctrines is even more 
appropriate when the work has become an industry standard. 
This logic is particularly important in light of the brave new world of 
monetization. In copyright as well as in patents, rights are being systematically 
stripped from any underlying product, grouped and repackaged, and then traded 
much like a commodity. As a result, large numbers of rights, that would not 
have garnered any direct return in the past, now appear on the market in the 
form of commoditized, tradable rights. The cost of testing these rights in court, 
combined with the possibility of large penalties, and uncertainties in 
intellectual property law allow those asserting such rights to obtain returns far 
above the value that the intellectual property could contribute to any tangible 
product.131 
 
 127.  See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
 128.  See Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, & Paul R. McHugh, “Mini-mental state”: 
A practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician, 12 J. 
PSYCHOL. RES. 189-98 (1975). 
 129.  See John C. Newman & Robin Feldman, Copyright and Open Access at the 
Bedside, 365 N. Engl. J. Med. 2447-49 (2011). 
 130.   Marshal F. Folstein, The Birth of the MMS, 2 THIS WEEK’S CITATION CLASSIC  18 
(Jan. 8, 1990); see also Wesson, supra note 109 (discussing the history of the MMSE and its 
comparison to other tests, as well as citing Folstein’s “Birth of the MMS” article). 
 131.  For an in-depth exploration of monetization in copyright and patent and a 
discussion of how rights can be used to extract economic rents above a reasonable return on 
investment, see Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, STAN. J.L. BUS & FIN. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127558; see 
also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357 (2012) 
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In this context, arbitrageurs are searching for old rights that can be revived 
and asserted against successful products on the market. The problem is bad 
enough in patents, where the rights last for two decades. In copyright, where 
the rights can continue to haunt us for more than a hundred years, the prospect 
of resurrection of old rights is particularly troubling. In this environment, 
courts must be vigilant in preventing parties from discarding direct or indirect 
permission obligations merely by transferring the right. 
CONCLUSION 
Attempts to assert copyright in cognitive medical testing should be rejected 
by the courts that eventually face the issue. When a medical test consists of 
nothing but words, asserting copyright in those words serves as a back door 
approach for using copyright to gain control of a process—something that is 
the proper purview of patent law, rather than copyright. The logic would apply 
in all such testing, but the assertion of copyright in the Mini-Mental State 
Exam, is particularly inappropriate. Much of the value of the test flows from its 
adaptation as an industry standard, rather than the labor of the authors. In 
addition, the fact that the authors permitted the work to be used freely for 
decades has created the expectation in users that work would be freely 
available and has encouraged its adoption as the industry standard. After 
standing silent for decades, the authors cannot now decide that the test provides 
a convenient vehicle for monetization. 
Undoubtedly, this issue will make its way to the steps of the courthouse 
sometime soon. We hope that the judges who are faced with these decisions 
will recognize that attempted assertion of copyrights in this context is a 
distortion of the logic underlying both patent and copyright. Equally important, 
these copyright assertions threaten to harm both medical research and the 
delivery of medical care for everyone. 
 
(available at http://dltr.law.duke.edu/2012/11/30/the-america-invents-act-500-effects-of-
patent-monetization-entities-on-us-litigation/); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants 
Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1. 
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APPENDIX A 












MMSE [1] Copyright registered to authors. 
Exclusive license from authors to 







MoCA [2] Copyright registered to author. 
Generally free to use and distribute for 
clinical and education use, permission 






SLUMS [3] Public domain according to author (J. 
Newman, personal communication) 




CAM [5] Copyright registered to author. 
Generally free to use for clinical or 
research purposes with 
acknowledgement, permission required 













GPCOG [7] Generally free for clinical or research 
use, permission required for 
commercial use of publication. See: 
http://www.gpcog.com.au/faq.php 
Sweet 16 Sweet 16 [8] Copyright registered to author. 
Generally free for clinical or research 
use, permission required for 
commercial use. Not currently 
 
 132.  This appendix is simply an illustrative list of tools known to the authors for which 
copyright claims are indicated, either by a licensing program or by placement of the test in 
the public domain—an indication of belief that potential copyright claims might exist. 
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